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WHO SHOULD BE ENTITLED
TO CLAIM THE NEW
EDUCATION CREDITS?
by Glenn E. Coven

Glenn E. Coven is the Mills E. Godwin Professor of Law at the College of William & Mary.
Professor Coven believes that the education
assistance provisions enacted in 1997, while long
overdue, were ill-considered and poorly constructed. Focusing on what should have been the
simple question of who is entitled to claim an
education tax credit, this report illustrates the
harm that inadequate drafting produces. While
section 25A appeared to deny a credit to a dependent child, an unfair and unwise result, the
proposed regulations allow parents to shift the
credit to their children but only on the forfeiture
of the deduction for the personal exemption. That
rule, says Coven, imposes a harsh penalty on lowand middle-income taxpayers but no penalty at
all on high-income taxpayers. Neither result is
consistent with the overall aim of the education
credits.
This report is an excerpt from a broader study
of the drafting deficiencies in the educational assistance provisions currently being undertaken
by the author. Because of the poor quality of these
sections, considerable corrective legislation will
be required to fulfill the promise of the 1997 legislation.
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In 1997 Congress at long last undertook to provide
some relief from the spiraling costs of higher education. Naturally, the relief was extended through the
income tax system and assumed a variety of forms. The
central feature of the new legislation1 was the adoption
in section 25A of two types of education tax credits. As
has become characteristic of tax legislation, section 25A
and the other education assistance provisions were
very poorly designed and executed. One particularly
ill-considered aspect of this legislation was the seemingly simple question of who is to be entitled to claim
the new credits. In most families, after all, both the
parents and the child make some contribution to the
cost of higher education. This problem, of course, is
not new. Dependent children who earn income have
always incurred deductible expenses, some of which
were paid by the child and some of which were paid
by the parents. The treatment of these payments has
always been governed by the generally applicable rules
of taxation.
In drafting the educational credits, however, Congress ignored that traditional approach and adopted
instead a series of novel solutions to the problem of
allocating tax allowances between parents and their
dependent children. Those solutions were terribly misguided. In an valiant effort to make sense out of this
legislation, the Treasury has issued proposed regulations containing solutions that are equally novel and
equally misguided. The difficulties with this
statutory /regulatory approach to the allocation of
credits are catalogued here in the hope that the section
25A approach does not spread to other legislation.
I. The Education Credits at a Glance
For no very important reason, section 25A creates
two distinct credits. The rather misleadingly named
HOPE scholarship credit reimburses 100 percent of the
first $1,000 of education expenses and 50 percent of the
next $1,000 for a maximum credit of $1,500. The credit
may be claimed without limit for each eligible student

lIn addition, section 530 added an IRA-like savings account
for education expenses and section 220 allows a limited
deduction for interest on loans for education. Section references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended,
and the regulations thereunder.
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but is only available, in general, for each of the first
two years of college-level education. The Lifetime
learning credit is equal to 20 percent of education expenses to a maximum of $5,000 ($10,000 after 2002) and
can be claimed in an unlimited number of years (but
not with respect to the expenses of a student for which
a HOPE credit is claimed). The Lifetime credit is a
per-taxpayer credit; the $5,000 or $10,000 ceiling applies without regard to the number of students that the
taxpayer is supporting. For both credits, the expenses
for which credit may be claimed are limited to tuition
and most fees paid by the taxpayer for the education
of the taxpayer, his or her spouse, and any dependent
and excludes expenses paid by a tax free receipt (such
as a scholarship) other than a gift. The ability to claim
either credit is phased out for taxpayers having adjusted gross income (AGI) in excess of $80,000 on a joint
return and disappears at $100,000. There are, of course,
a number of other rules governing the credit, some of
which are the subject of the following remarks.

II. Who Gets the Credit and for What
In allocating the education credits between parents
and child, section 25A embodies an all-or-nothing approach: in any given year, only one taxpayer can claim
an education credit for any given student. The identity
of that taxpayer depends on whether a dependency
exemption for the student is allowed to another taxpayer. If the exemption for the student is allowed to
another, the student is barred from claiming any education credit - even if the student actually pays his or
her own expenses out of his or her own earned income. 2
Rather, the credit must be claimed by the person to
whom the dependency exemption is allowed. On the
other hand, if the exemption is not allowed to another,
no one but the student may claim the credit. Just when
a dependency exemption "is allowed" to another taxpayer is discussed below.
When the credits are to be claimed by someone other
than the student, the credit for expenses actually paid
by the student is not necessarily lost. Under section
25A(g)(3)(B), in this situation, expenses paid by the
child are treated as if they had been paid by the parent
(or other person entitled to the dependency exemption), thus entitling the parent to claim a credit for
those expenses. The code thus assigns to the parent the
income tax benefit for expenses paid by a child out of
the child's own funds.
When the student is not a dependent and thus must
claim his or her own credits, the code lacks a comparable rule attributing the expenses paid by the parent
to the student. While this different statutory treatment
might suggest a different result, the proposed regulations do not take that approach. Rather, under prop.
reg. section 1.25A-5(a), education expenses of a student
that are paid by a third party, normally the parent, are
treated as if they passed through the hands of the student. Thus, the third party is treated as making a gift
to the student and the student is treated as paying his
or her own expenses. That treatment entitles the stu2Section 2SA(g)(3)(A).
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dent to claim the education credit for his or her education expenses that are in fact paid by another (unless,
of course, the student is a dependent of another in
which event the expenses are re-treated as paid by that
other person3 ) . Although the regulations are not sufficiently clear on the point, presumably the rule of 5(a)
would be applicable regardless of the fact that it is the
parent that is legally obligated to the educational institution to pay the expenses.
A. The Novelty of the Allocation Rule
In barring the claiming of credits by one for whom
the personal exemption is allowed on the return of
another, Congress may have thought that it was following an established precedent. It wasn't. No other
section of the code disallows a tax benefit for an out of
pocket expenditure to a taxpayer simply because that
taxpayer could be claimed as a dependent on another's
tax return. Section 151(d)(2) bars an individual from
deducting his or her own personal exemption if
another taxpayer may also deduct a personal exemption attributable to that individual. The personal exemption, however, does not reflect a specific disbursement. In fact, the exemption is really an aspect of the
rate structure and functionally imposes a zero rate of
tax on the first slice of income. Section 151(d)(2) quite
appropriately bars a second exemption to a child when
an exemption has already been claimed by the parent.

In barring the claiming of credits by
one for whom the personal exemption
may be claimed on the return of
another, Congress may have thought
that it was following an established
precedent. It wasn't.
Section 63(c)(5) limits the use of the standard deduction to offset tax on the investment income of an individual who can be claimed as a dependent on the
return of another. Again, this provision does not provide a tax benefit for a specific expenditure. Today's
standard deduction is designed to provide a measure
of tax relief to low-income taxpayers who lack specific
personal deductions. Section 63(c)(5) reflects the entirely reasonable decision to discourage certain income
splitting techniques by denying that relief to the unearned income of minors.
A similar disallowance is contained in section 220.
That section, added in 1996, allows on an experimental
basis a deduction for amounts contributed to medical
savings accounts. The funds accumulated in such an
account may be used to pay the medical expenses of
the taxpayer and his or her dependents. Under section
220(b)(6), dependent children are barred from creating
3Seriously. The proposed regulations give this example.
Child is a claimed dependent of divorced Morn. Ex-Hubby
pays Child's tuition. Who gets the credit? Morn! See prop. reg.
section 1.2SA-S(b)(2). The rule is favorable to taxpayers because it preserves the credit but otherwise makes no logical
sense at all.
TAX NOTES, September 20, 1999
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their own accounts. That decision, while perhaps not
entirely beyond criticism, still does not bar a child from
deducting an out-of-pocket expenditure. Rather, section 220 bars dependent children from making an expenditure by denying them the opportunity to establish a medical savings account. Significantly, if such a
child does have a medical expense that the child in fact
pays out of his or her own funds, the child at that time
is entitled to a deduction under section 213.

I

This new rule governing the allocation
of the education credits is
objectionable for a series of reasons.

The extension of this concept in section 25A, therefore, is novel. Unlike its predecessors, the education
credit is the first instance in which expenses of a dependent child, paid by the child, have been reallocated
to another. In spite of the significance of this change in
the manner of taxing family income, there is no indication that the drafters of section 25A considered the
desirability of this approach or the extent to which it
should be extended to other provisions. Indeed, there
is no indication that the drafters even were aware that
they were adopting a novel tax concept.
B. Objections to the Allocation Rule
This new rule governing the allocation of the education credits is objectionable for a series of reasons.
1. A rule that denies a taxpayer the tax benefit from his
or her own expenses and gives that benefit to another
is, and will be perceived by taxpayers as, unfair. Of
course, an amateur economist could explain that the
credit is just as valuable, maybe more valuable,4 in the
hands of the parent as in the hands of the child. However, the arguments would not have impressed my children and, I suspect, will not impress many others.
Rather, this provision will leave many new taxpayers
believing themselves to have been cheated out of a tax
credit, thus planting a seed of hostility toward the tax
system in the application of a provision that should
have left the student with a friendly feeling.
2. The assignment of income doctrine, which requires
each taxpayer to report his or her own items of income
and expense, is a central protection of the integrity of
the code. The rules that flow from that doctrine have
the effect of stemming taxpayer manipulations calculated to avoid the progressive rate structure or otherwise improperly reduce tax liability by engaging in
transactions that lack economic substance. Section
25A(g)(3) requires a clear and egregious violation of
that rule. One taxpayer is given a tax benefit for a loss
economically incurred by another. For Congress to require, or even authorize, violations of such fundamental ~ule~ is highly undesirable. It is difficult enough to
mamtam taxpayer respect for broad anti-tax avoidance

4After all, one must have an income tax liability before
credits are of any value.
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doctrines without Congress deliberately undermining
them.
3. This violation of the assignment of income rules is
particularly unfortunate because it creates internal inconsistency within the code. In other, quite similar
areas, the normal assignment of income rules apply.
That means that in closely related areas under the tax
law, two sharply inconsistent results are required.
Thus, when a dependent child pays his medical exp~nses, he .is entitled to a ~eduction but when he pays
hIS educatlOn expenses, hIS parent is entitled to the
credit. Such inconsistent rules are an obvious and
wholly unnecessary source of complexity and taxpayer
confusion.
4. In treating expenses paid by the parent as if they
were paid by the child, the regulations have suspended
the application of a second important anti-tax avoidance rule, the step transaction doctrine. In the absence
of this regulation, a parent wishing to cause a child to
be treated as having paid certain education expenses
would face a significant hurdle. If the parent transferred funds to the child that the child promptly
retransferred to the educational institution, a routine
application of the step transaction doctrine might well
bar the desired result. Since the child would be acting
as a mere conduit and the funds did not come to rest
in the hands of the child, the child's involvement in the
transaction would be ignored and the payment treated
as passing directly from the parent to the institution.
Since the child would not be regarded as paying the
expense, the child would not be entitled to any credit.
The regulations evidently suspend the application
of the step transaction doctrine in this context. Even
though the child may play the role of the most embarrassingly obvious conduit, the tax law will treat the child
as the bona fide payor of the expense and entitled to the
resulting tax benefit. Of course, the application of the step
transaction doctrine in this intra-family context would be
difficult, as its application usually is. And, the application
would also produce a harsh result. If the credit must be
claimed by the student but the expenses are paid by the
parent, the credit for those expenses would be lost absent
the regulatory rule. Nevertheless, undermining the
validity of the step transaction doctrine is as short-sighted
as is the undermining of the assignment of income
doctrine. If these rules are to be waived by the government for little or no reason, taxpayers will find in that
justification for ignoring the application of those rules in
other contexts.
5. The code expressly attributes payments by the child
to the parent; it quite clearly does not attribute payments by the parent to the child. Obviously, the distinct
possibility exists that these different rules were the
result of an oversight by the drafter of section 25A.
Nevertheless, the code plainly adopts a different rule
which the regulations plainly ignore. The regulation
would thus seem to strain the boundaries of the Treasury's interpretative authority. Significantly, the rule
indi~ated by congressional silence is that taxpayers are
reqUlred to report their own expenditures and it is that
fundamental rule that the Treasury regulations ignore.
Perhaps the boundaries have been breached.
1645

COMMENTARY I SPECIAL REPORT

III. When Is an Exemption Allowed' to Another?
I

Wrongly or not, section 25A(g)(3) denies an education credit to a student if the deduction for the personal
exemption attributable to the student "is allowed" to
another. Just what the drafters of section 25A meant by
"is allowed" is an interesting question. Under the antecedent sections 151(d) and 63(c), the respective allowances are barred to an individual if the personal exemption for that individual is "allowable" to another.
Under those sections, it is well established that "allowable" means "entitled to claim the benefit whether or
not it is in fact claimed and whether or not it does the
taxpayer any good."s The principal practical effect of
the use of "allowable" in section 151 arises in connection with the phaseout of the personal exemption.
Under section 151(d)(3), the ability to deduct this
allowance is reduced for taxpayers whose adjusted
gross income on a joint return exceeds about $190,000
and entirely disappears when income exceeds about
$312,000. As the value of the child's personal exemption disappears, the high-income parents cannot pass
the deduction to the child by foregoing the deduction
on their own return. Because the personal exemption
was "allowable" to the parent, although not in fact
claimed, the child remains barred from claiming his or
her own personal exemption. Thus the use of "allowable" in section 151 prevents the avoidance of the
phase-out rules .

I

Just what the drafters of section 25A
meant by 'is aI/owed' is an interesting
question.

In paragraph (g)(3) of section 25A, however, Congress used different language. The credits are not
barred to a child if a deduction for the child's personal
exemption is "allowable" to another; rather, they are
barred if the deduction "is allowed" to another. Did
that different choice of language signal a different
meaning? In the portions of the code that address
depreciation and the resulting adjustments to basis,
such as section 1016, the words "allowed" and "allowable" are given distinct meanings. Allowable means the
proper amount of depreciation prescribed by law while
allowed means the amount of depreciation actually
taken on the income tax return, which may be more or
less than the amount properly allowable. 6 If this meaning of allowed applied to the use of that word in section
25A, it would suggest that the education credits are
barred to a child only if the parent actually claimed the
personal exemption for the child - regardless of
whether the deduction was allowable.
On the other hand, elsewhere in the code allowed
does not seem to have been given such a specialized
meaning but rather is used in its conventional sense of
meaning permitted. Illustrations occur in virtually

5See IRS, Ta x Rules for Children and Dependents (Pub . 929),
p.5.
6See sections 1016(a)(2) and 1245(a)(2) .
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every section of the code. Indeed, when allowed is used
in this sense, it is sometimes used interchangeably with
allowable.7 If section 25A is using allowed in this sense
to mean permitted, then education credits are barred
to a child if the parents are permitted to claim the
child's personal exemption regardless of whether they
do.
The legislative history is of no help. In describing
section 25A(g)(3), the reports refer to whether the taxpayer "claims" the student as a dependent, which
might be read as supporting the section 1016 meaning
of allowed. s However, section 24, which extends the
child tax credit, was enacted along with section 25A
and like that section conditions its relief on whether
the taxpayer is "allowed" a deduction for the child's
personal exemption. 9 In describing that provision, the
reports refer to whether the taxpayer "can claim" the
deduction!l0
The proposed regulations to section 25A(g)(3) adopt
the section 1016 meaning of allowed. Under section
1.25A-1(g), if a taxpayer is eligible to claim a student
as a dependent but does not, then the personal exemption is not treated as "allowed" to the taxpayer. Accordingly, paragraph (g)(3) does not apply and the student
can claim the education credit for the costs of his or
her own education. In the process of creating this rule,
the regulations invent the new concept of a "claimed
dependent." A claimed dependent, of course, is a dependent for whom the taxpayer actually claims the
ded uction for the personal exemption on the taxpayer's return,u Presumably, if the taxpayer could
have, but did not, claim the deduction, the dependent
is "unclaimed." Apparently, taxpayers are permitted to
switch the status of their dependents from claimed to
unclaimed annually without limitation but the regulations are silent on that point.
The proposed regulations do not address, at least
not expressly, the painfully obvious issue of the interaction of the concept of a claimed dependent and the
phaseout of the deduction for the personal exemption.
Section 1.25A-1(g) only rather vaguely states that if a
taxpayer "is eligible to, but does not, claim" the child,
then the child is unclaimed. One can only guess that if
a deduction has been fully phased out for the taxpayer,
then the taxpayer is not "eligible" to claim the dependent, although that is far from clear. Reading the
proposed regulation in this manner, if the deduction
for a child's personal exemption has been reduced to,
say, $54 by the phase-out of the allowance, the child

7Compare, e.g., section 32(a)(2) ("the amount of the credit
allowable ... under paragraph (I)") with section 221(b)(1)
("the deduction allowed by subsection (an.
sJt. Comm. on Taxation, General Explanation of Tax Legislation Enacted in 1997, 105th Cong, 1st Sess., p . 15 (1997) .
9Section 24(c)(I)(A).
IOJt. Comm. on Taxation, General Explanation of Ta x Legislation Enacted in 1997, 105th Cong, 1st Sess., p. 7 (1997) .
IIActually, the regulations with infuriating ambiguity
define a claimed dependent as one for whom the personal
exemption is "allowed" to the taxpayer but we know what
they mean. Prop. reg . section 1.25A-2(a).
TAX NOTES, September 20, 1999
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remains a claimed dependent. However, if the deduction is reduced to zero, the child automatically becomes
an unclaimed dependent.
If these regulations correctly interpret section
25A(g)(3), then the allocation of the education credit
between parent and child is elective and that election
is fully within the control of the parties. Maybe so, but
there is no indication in the committee reports that
Congress understood that paragraph (g)(3) created an
election. Certainly it would have been unconscionably
devious for Congress to create a surprising and significant rule but communicate its existence only
through a subtle and ambiguous word ending. It seems
more likely that the drafters of section 25A never
thought matters through this far and that the elective
feature is one dreamed up by the Treasury as a means
of blunting the harshness of the congressional denial
of the credit to a dependent child who pays his or her
own way.
IV. Deficiencies in the Elective Allocation
Whether this election is one intended by Congress
or manufactured by the Treasury, however, it is both
novel and very poorly constructed. It is novel because
Congress has not previously treated the status of a
dependent for whom the personal exemption can be
claimed by another as an election within the control of
that other taxpayer. It is poorly constructed for all of
the following reasons .
A. The Inherent Complexity of Elections
Elections, while normally appearing favorable to
taxpayers, generally reflect bad policy and are not in
the best interests of taxpayers. The very existence of an
election creates complexity and mandates tax planning
with its attendant expense. In addition, elections undermine the notion that tax issues have a correct
answer and create situations in which a single set of
facts may produce two different tax liabilities. In these
respects, elections tend to undermine the integrity of
the income tax and encourage taxpayer manipulation.
Even for one more favorably inclined towards elections, this election is particularly unfortunate.
B. Intentional Forfeiture of the Personal Exemption?
The notion that allowed means actually claimed permits the parent to shift the education credits to the
student/ child by failing to claim the personal exemption for the child on their (the parent's) return. But, the
personal exemption itself, of course, is denied to the
child if the deduction for their personal exemption is
allowable to another. Accordingly, if the parent does
forgo the deduction for the personal exemption, the
child nevertheless cannot claim that allowance - it is
permanently lost to all. The proposition then that
allowed means claimed is that, in the context of legislation designed to assist families and particularly to
assist in paying the costs of education, Congress
allowed the education credits to be claimed by the
student but only at the price of forfeiting the student's
personal exemption. Even for this Congress, that
would be bizarre.
TAX NOTES, September 20, 1999

It would also be manifestly unfair. If an elective
shifting of the education credit is to be allowed, it is
not necessarily inappropriate to attach a reasonable
cost or penalty to the making of that election. However,
the forfeiture of the personal exemption is not such a
penalty. It is grossly unreasonable and will he so
viewed by taxpayers. Not only is the amount of the
penalty imposed excessive, a point illustrated below,
but the loss of the personal exemption for the very
student whose education expenses the new provisions
are designed to defray is, and will appear to taxpayers,
as senseless and counterproductive, another instance
of being shortchanged by Congress.

I

It is the forfeiture of the personal
exemption to all that makes the
regulatory interpretation of section
25A(g)(3) distinctly unfair.

It must be underscored that the overall result of this
elective shifting of the credit is not at all similar to the
mandatory shifting of the credit to the student / child
that will occur when the child is no longer a dependent.
At that point, the parent loses the deduction for the
child's personal exemption and is no longer able to
claim education credits attributable to the child.
Rather, the student must claim his or her own education credits. However, here the deduction for the personal exemption is not forfeited; the child can now
deduct his or her own exemption. It is the forfeiture of
the personal exemption to all that makes the regulatory
interpretation of section 25A(g)(3) distinctly unfair.
It would also be expensive. At the 28 percent bracket,
which is the bracket in which many parents of college-age
students find themselves, a deduction for the current
exemption of $2,700 results in a tax savings of $756.
For such a taxpayer, forfeiting the personal exemption
means increasing one's tax liability by that amount. On
the other hand, the maximum HOPE credit that can be
claimed for a single child is only $1,500 (and the maximum Lifetime credit is currently only $1,000) . If a
parent in that tax bracket shifted the entitlement to a
HOPE credit to a child, the net benefit obtained by the
family from the credit would be $1,500 less $756, or
$744. Accordingly, the proposition asserted by the regulations is that Congress did allow shifting the education credit to the children but, if that occurred, the
value of the credit was to be halved. That result is
simply ridiculous and it is just very hard to believe that
it was intended by Congress. Of course, it might have
been that the drafters of section 25A did intend that
parents could shift the credit to their children but they
forgot that parents cannot shift the personal exemption
itself! Hard to say.

C. A Deliberate Undermining of the Limitations?
There are two obvious reasons why a parent might
wish to shift the credit to the child. One is the non-tax
factor of family harmony. Older children tend to become incensed when they discover that they must pay
a tax on relatively meager earned income (not to mention trivial amounts of savings account interest) be1647
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cause their parents get the deduction for their personal
exemption. When those children discover that they
cannot get an education credit with respect to amounts
of their own income that they have used to pay their
education expenses, their irritation will, on occasion,
arise to a sufficient level that it will be in the interest
of the family for the parents to shift the credit. In this
connection, it seems likely that the resulting irritation
of the children and of their parents will immediately
be redirected toward the tax law and the IRS. Dumb
rules like this one must have a great deal to do with
the taxpayer antagonism toward the payment of taxes
that is currently giving the IRS such fits.
The second reason, however, is that the credit is
worth more to the children than it is to the parent. In
general, of course, credits are equally valuable to all
taxpayers. However, there are several reasons why the
education credits might be more valuable to the child
than to the parent. Among these explanations, the two
most likely are that the parent's ability to claim the
credit was limited by the $5,000 (or $10,000) ceiling on
the Lifetime credit or, in the hands of the parent, the
credit was subject to a phaseout. Shifting the credit to
the child, therefore, will often be a tax planning device,
undertaken for the purpose of avoiding the quite
specific and deliberate limitations on the use of the
credit that were inserted in section 25A. In this context
the proposition is that Congress created a series of
relatively strict limitations on the availability of the
credit but then created a scheme through which those
limitations could be avoided by well advised taxpayers
but only if the taxpayer was willing to pay a toll charge
in the nature of relinquishing the personal exemption
for the student.

I

When the effect of the phaseout of the
deduction for the personal exemption
is introduced into the equation, the
scheme becomes utterly indefensible.

Consider, for example, the simple case of a family
whose children include 22-year-old twins who are both
juniors in college. The parents are entitled to two personal exemptions with respect to those children, each
producing a tax reduction of $756, and a Lifetime credit
(in 2003) for educational expenses of $10,000, resulting
in a credit of $2,000. However, each child has eligible
expenses of $8,000, so education expenses of $6,000 are
not creditable. Under the solution contained in the regulations, the parent may give up the personal exemption for one twin, in which event the parent will also
lose a credit of $400 on the expenses of $2,000 attributable to that child. However, the child may now
take a credit on all $8,000 of her expenses, which would
be worth $1,600 - provided that the child has a sufficient income tax liability to absorb such a credit. If that
income exists, the $1,600 credit available to the child
will likely be worth more than the $1,176 ($400 plus
$756) tax savings lost by the parent. Parents able to
work out this result, therefore, would be well advised
to "unclaim" one of the twins.
1648

Such a scheme, whether deliberately designed or
resulting from drafter inattention, would be objectionable on several grounds. (a) If the limitations on
the availability of the credit are worth having, they
should not be avoidable with the help of an accountant.
(b) The scheme is complex and its existence means that
to obtain maximum benefit from the education credits,
taxpayers must be willing and able to engage in fairly
sophisticated tax planning. Given the number of taxpayers affected by this provision whose tax returns
otherwise would be generally uncomplicated, that
result is highly unfortunate. (c) While a shift of the
credit may increase the tax savings to the family, in
many instances the forfeiture of the personal exemption is an excessive price for this benefit. However,
when the effect of the phaseout of the deduction for
the personal exemption is introduced into the equation,
the scheme becomes utterly indefensible.

D. A Toll Charge Targeted at the Poor?
Losing the deduction for the personal exemption is
a cost only if a taxpayer has the deduction at the start.
Because the deduction is subject to one of the everpresent phase outs, not all taxpayers do have a deduction for personal exemptions to lose. Those taxpayers,
accordingly, can shift the education credits to their children without the imposition of a toll charge. This interaction of the phaseout of the personal exemption
with the phaseout of the education credits and the
ability to shift that credit to the child produces a result
that is plainly inconsistent with the expressed design
of the new provisions.
On a joint return, the education credits are phased
out for taxpayers having an AGI between $80,000 and
$100,000. Below that level, parents may obtain a full
benefit from the credit without shifting it to the children. After that income level is reached, however, the
only way that any benefit can be obtained is if the
credits can be shifted to the children.12 On the other
hand, the deduction for the personal exemption begins
to phase out on a joint return for 1998 when AGI
reaches $189,950. Until that income level is reached,
shifting the education credits to the child requires
giving up the full tax benefit of the personal exemption.
When AGI rises to $312,450, the personal exemption is
entirely phased out. Accordingly, as income increases
from about $190,000 to about $310,000, shifting the
education credits to the child "costs" a decreasing
amount. Ultimately, the resulting loss of the personal
exemption costs nothing at all since that deduction has
been completely phased out and is no longer there to
lose. The result of all this, in round numbers, goes
something like this: Taxpayers earning $125,000 can
shift the HOPE credit of $1,500 to their children if they
pay a toll charge of $800,13 which results in a net tax
benefit from the credit of $700. Taxpayers earning
J2The same need to shift the credits can occur at lower
income levels if the taxpayer encounters the ceiling on the
Lifetime credit or one of the other limitations of the ability to
benefit from the credits.
13The value of a $2,700 personal exemption to one in the
31 percent bracket, which begins at a taxable income of
$104,050, is $837.
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$250,000, entitled to only one-half the benefit of the
personal exemption, can shift the credit at a cost of
about $480, which results in a net benefit of $1,020.
Taxpayers earning over $375,000 can shift the credit at
no cost and thus the family as a whole will continue
to derive a full tax benefit of $1,500 after the parents
have shifted the tax credit to their children by foregoing the (nonexistent) personal exemption. Accordingly,
as income rises, the value of the education credits that
have been shifted to dependent children also rises.
Imposing a reasonable toll charge on the transfer of
the education credits to dependents may not be the best
policy but it is not inherently irrational. However, imposing a toll charge that burdens only low- and middleincome taxpayers is. And imposing a toll charge but
exempting high-income taxpayers from its scope is
simply unacceptable. It follows that the elective
scheme for shifting the education credit as developed
in the proposed regulations is not acceptable.
The ability of high-income taxpayers to shift the
education credits to their children cost free has further
implications. While on the face of section 25A it appears that the benefit of the education credits is phased
out as income rises, that turns out to be illusory. To the
extent that the education credits can be shifted to other
members of the family, such as the student in question,
without a loss in value, the actual benefit from those
credits has not been phased out. Such a shift of the
benefit of the credits can occur if (a) the student is
treated as paying his or her own education expenses
even though he or she does not, (b) the student is
entitled to claim the education credit, (c) the student
has a sufficient tax liability to absorb the credit, and
(d) the parent is not subject to any penalty on yielding
the credit to the student. As discussed above, all those
requirements are readily met under the proposed regulations for very-high-income families. Accordingly,
the apparent phaseout of the education credit has no
practical application to high-income taxpayers. Rather,
the phaseout of the education credits applies only to
the category of taxpayers whose AGI falls between
$80,000 (the start of the phaseout of the education
credits on a joint return) and $312,000 (the end of the
phaseout of the personal exemption).

V. Toward a Better Approach
The drafters of section 25A did not need to develop
a new scheme for allocating the tax benefit from the
payment of expenses of dependent children. This issue
has been addressed under the code since the inception
of the income tax in a manner entirely consistent with
fundamental principles of taxation. Under the general
scheme of the tax law, children, including minor, dependent children, are taxpayers in their own right, entirely distinct from their parents. If their income
achieves the same levels applicable to adults, they are
required to file their own income tax returns, reporting
their own income and claiming their own deductions. 14
14IRS, Tax Rules for Children and Dependents (Pub. 929), p. 4,
and Bittker & McMahon, Federal Income Taxation of Individuals,
para. 34.5[3].
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While authorities are scant, it is firmly established that
when the child pays its own expenses, whether personal
or business-related, the child, and only the child, can
deduct those expenditures regardless of whether the
source of the payment is the child's own funds or funds
supplied by the parent. 15 Indeed, absent specific statutory
authority, even where the parent pays expenses of the
child, the deduction for those expenses belongs to the
child and cannot be claimed by the parents. 16
The code section that would seem to contains the
closest analogy 17 to education expenses is section 213
which grants a deduction for medical expenses. Under
that section, like section 25A, a taxpayer is entitled to
a deduction for medical expense of the taxpayer, his or
her spouse, and of any dependent paid by the taxpayer.
Thus, where a parent pays the medical expense of a
dependent child, the parent, by virtue of this specific
statutory provision, is entitled to deduct the payment.
However, if the child pays its own expenses, the deduction is not attributed to the parent. Rather, the deduction must be claimed by the child and may not be
claimed by the parent. In short, each taxpayer, parent
or child, deducts the expenses they pay - and only
the expenses they pay.
Initially, section 25A should be amended to delete
the mistreatment of dependent children contained in
subsection (g)(3) and to replace that rule with the traditional approach currently applied to medical expenses.
If the amendment stopped at that, all taxpayers would
be able to avoid the ceilings and phaseouts that under
current law only high-income taxpayers can avoid.
That alone would be an improvement. To go beyond
that point and seek to apply the limitations on the
availability of the credit applicable to the parent to the
disbursements of the child will require careful consideration of the general question of the taxation of the
family, an issue far broader than section 25A.

VI. Conclusion
The education assistance provisions enacted in 1997
were quite poorly constructed. They produce an endless series of harsh or foolish results, one of which is
outlined here. In a decent attempt to correct some of
the worst features of the statute, the proposed regulations have offered some creative interpretations of section 25A. But, acting within the limits of the regulatory
process, the Treasury cannot make a silk purse out of
this sow's ear. Indeed, it may have made matters worse.
The unavoidable conclusion, therefore, is that the collection of education assistance provisions deserves
more serious congressional attention.
15GCM 33678 (Nov. 6, 1967).
16Section 73 and Harrison v. Comm 'r, T.C. Memo. 1978-476
(parents denied deduction for business expenses of minor
children paid by parent) .
17Under section l(g) the unearned income of a child under
the age of 14 is taxed at a rate geared to the income of the
parent. However, in general this income and any related expenses remain reportable by the child. To that rule, section
1(g)(7) provides a highly restricted election to report minor
amounts of the investment income of a child directly on the
tax return of the parent.
1649

